




Foreword: Still Unfinished, Ever Unfinished
Anita Bernstein
Brooklyn Law School, anita.bernstein@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Law and Gender Commons, and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 641 (1999-2000)
FOREWORD: STILL UNFINISHED, EVER UNFINISHED
ANITA BERNSTEIN*
For decades popular commentators- and even scholars-have
been proclaiming that feminism has run out of ideas and purpose.'
The line is certainly familiar: most progressive movements receive
this kind of premature interment from their wishful-thinking enemies.
But critics of feminism go further than most antiprogressives, both in
the diversity of their attacks and their bold claim that, having
outlasted its useful life, feminism now actually impedes the well-being
of women.
Some accuse activists of whining, and keep alive the phrase
"victim feminism." Some use what they like to call "evolutionary
psychology" to argue that the reason women have less money and
power and public honor than men lies not in their culture but in the
inherent nature, or tendencies, or strategies of women, all of which
keep them out of various markets and competitions: 2 Feminism
cannot overcome the destiny that originates in female anatomy.
Others seize the future as antifeminist, claiming that younger women
of today are very different from the famed heroines of the movement,
and if age separates women from one another, then the unitary claims
of feminism about women become less urgent.3
Such attacks come approximately from the right. But the left too
has its quarrels with feminism. In past decades, left-wing anti-
feminism claimed to be a matter of priorities: first the revolution, the
class struggle, and so forth; women could wait. More recently leftists
have faulted the movement for its interest in the line between men
and women. Feminism is wrong, goes the charge, for proceeding as if
* Thanks to Katharine Baker for helpful editorial advice.
1. Martha Chamallas notes a "conventional wisdom... that gender discrimination is
largely a thing of the past and that feminism, as we have known it, can provide little help to
those women trying to cope with the debilitating effects of sexual bias." MARTHA CHAMALLAS,
INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 307 (1999); see also Orit Kamir, Feminist Law
and Film: Imagining Judges and Justice, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV 899, 899 (2000) (referring to the
desire to append "post" to the word feminism).
2. See Katharine K. Baker, Biology for Feminists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805,805 (2000).
3. See RENE DENFIELD, THE NEW VICTORIANS: A YOUNG WOMAN'S CHALLENGE TO
THE OLD FEMINIST ORDER 10-11 (1995).
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there were two and only two genders, as if race and class did not
shape and divide women, or as if justice could be achieved through
reference to transcendent Enlightenment principles. 4
This chorus of weary futility misdescribes a social movement
whose strength continues to grow-a force that can inform other
crusades and explain what works in American public policy, at the
level of both theory and practice. Detractors cast feminism as
orthodox, pass6, and trite, but it is they who espouse what is now the
conventional wisdom. When writers trivialize and demonize
feminism-"it no longer matters" comes out of one side of their
mouth and "it's pernicious" out of the other-these judgments tend
to escape public questioning and refutation. Anyone who would
celebrate feminism as vital and current takes a defiant posture.
Celebrate what, exactly? Academic lawyers make a ritual of
defining their terms up front, and a law-review symposium on
unfinished feminist business is no occasion for an exception to this
custom. Let us begin, then, with a working definition of feminism. I
like one propounded by political philosopher Susan Moller Okin:
feminism to Okin is "the belief that women should not be
disadvantaged by their sex, that they should be recognized as having
human dignity equal to that of men, and that they should have the
opportunity to live as fulfilling and as freely chosen lives as men
can."5 While not free from controversy, definitions like this one,
which avoid making claims about female inclinations (toward care,
empathy, nurturing, and the like), offer the virtue-beloved to
liberals like Okin and me-of a certain parsimony: many feminists
hope that women will achieve (or be celebrated for) more than
dignity, equal opportunities to achieve fulfillment, and the removal of
socially enforced disabilities for women. But in order to call itself a
women's movement, feminism can aspire to no less. Rooting the
working definition in "liberal feminism" - a phrase often used
pejoratively 6-permits a wide range of views to join this Symposium.
"Unfinished business" distinguishes this Symposium from its
Chicago-Kent Law Review predecessor, Is the Law Male?,' and other
general-interest collections of essays on feminism, because it excludes
4. A classic is ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988).
5. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in Is MULTICULTURALISM
BAD FOR WOMEN? 9, 10 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
6. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 1, at 44-46 (defending "liberal feminism").
7. Symposium: Is the Law Male?, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293 (1993).
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numerous feminist subgenres of great interest. The unfinished
business of this Symposium includes no comparative studies, no
quantitative findings, and no scholarly reinterpretations of such
twentieth-century movements as contemporary psychoanalytic theory
and poststructuralism. Narrative, autobiography, and literary or
artistic expressions of feminism also lie outside the unfinished-
business boundary.
Addressing unfinished feminist business, then, each essay of the
Symposium presents a unique call to action, as well as an intellectual
stance. My own taste for policy and praxis, coupled with a belief that
law (with its pragmatic inclinations) cannot be eliminated by fiat from
the pages of a law review, dictated this preference for movement over
rumination (although, as about half the contributions will argue,
unfinished feminist business includes the need to reassess or criticize
various intellectual and theoretical fixtures) and a focus on the near-
term future. Support for this editorial choice will emerge from the
writings that follow.
Before you begin to read them, you might find it helpful to know
how these thirteen works were obtained, as their manner of collection
yielded a somewhat unexpected result. Essays reached the
Symposium by two means. A majority were written in response to
my invitation: "What do you, from your vantage point, think is
unfinished feminist business?" Or sometimes, "What do you think is
the most important element of unfinished feminist business?"-my
inexact way of inviting a writer to designate one neglected,
undervalued, or out-of-fashion pursuit, or perhaps to raise a subject
misperceived as extrinsic or peripheral to feminism. Most of my
invitations reached writers known to have produced impressive work
in what one might call "feminism plus": that is, the ability to combine
a feminist perspective with another area of expertise. The feminism-
plus strategy strove to bring together a variety of thinkers with a
common interest in feminism plus a separate interest in something
distinct, thereby providing readers with both divergence and common
ground.
Other contributions arrived qua essays rather than in response to
my perception of an author's scholarly reputation. When I'd learn
about a work in progress, or a manuscript not yet committed
anywhere for publication, that seemed integral to the Symposium, I'd
ask the writer to consider contributing it to these pages. Happily the
essay-based invitations yielded a good turnout, and familiar voices
thus mingle with newer ones, in a conversation that any host would
2000]
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want to foster at her table.
Like all collections, the Symposium can be appreciated as both
parts and a whole. Its parts require little by way of preface: the
writers, all articulate thinkers, will speak for themselves presently. In
the aggregate they make another point, an insight that changed my
own provisional understanding of "unfinished feminist business."
One might have thought that the phrase had some kind of unitary
meaning. From these Essays, however, feminist business emerges as
unfinished in two distinct, contrasting senses. The first sense in which
feminist business is unfinished is that particular work is still not
complete. The second sense, which I hadn't anticipated, is that a
particular project illustrates that feminist business will never be
complete.
Kate Millett launches our discussion, asking What Is to Be
Done?8 From her unique vantage point as a famed second-stage
visionary, Millett begins by offering a short and witty survey of the
contemporary feminist movement. She then nominates one course of
action as, in her view, the most necessary piece of unfinished feminist
business. Rather than analyze her choice here in this Foreword, I
simply classify it: Millett has raised a question and proposed an
answer. Several of the participants-just over half by my reckoning-
have also chosen to declare a path, or a remedy, or a goal to keep in
mind, while they note that the business of feminism is still unfinished.
Other participants favor a different, almost contrary, outlook. For
them feminism is not so much "still unfinished" as "ever unfinished":
a defining characteristic of feminism is that it never comes to rest.
I.
Essays in the first part of the Symposium may put a reader in
mind of the feminism
that defines itself as the unfinished business of humanism, stresses
the common human elements of experience, attacks the culturally
created and reinforced concepts of femininity and masculinity as
opposed to biological male and female, and argues for the
androgynous ideal of all individuals achieving their own best selves
irrespective of gender. 9
Bonnie Lyons, a specialist in contemporary American fiction, thus
8. Kate Millett, What Is to Be Done?, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 659 (2000).
9. Bonnie Lyons, Faith and Puttermesser: Contrasting Images of Two Jewish Feminists, in
TALKING BACK: IMAGES OF JEWISH WOMEN IN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE 139, 140-41
(Joyce Antler ed., 1998).
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defines the feminism of literary titan Cynthia Ozick, known for her
antipathy to being called a woman writer.10 This "androgynous
ideal," associated with liberal feminism, is for Lyons an instance of
unfinished business. Humanism encompasses feminism and would
share all of its rigors and priorities, if only humanists would realize
the extent of their liberatory vision. Instead this movement has
stopped short, recognizing the ideal of humanity but not fully
acknowledging the humanity of women. Without contending that the
Essays of the first part endorse this approach to feminism, I would
describe their agendas as congruent with it.
In this sense of the term, "unfinished feminist business" knows
what it needs to do and where it is going. An agenda has been in
place since the formation of second-stage feminism in the early 1970s.
This contemporary version of feminism came into being when, as was
mentioned, women activists realized that their colleagues in the Left
were marginalizing, postponing, and positing-out the job of women's
liberation in the name of antiwar and civil rights priorities-as if the
content of the antiwar and civil rights movements did not of
themselves demand freedom and justice for women.1 Against this
backdrop of social change, feminism notes the need to change more.
Now, decades later, two writers in the Symposium continue the
same task by challenging the still-fashionable construct of
postmodernism: Kelly Kleiman brings one specific indictment to our
table,12 while Catharine MacKinnon attacks postmodernism as
ideology, deeming it antagonistic to feminism as a movement and to
women as human beings. 13  (Later we will hear from other
participants, situated in the "ever unfinished" half of the Symposium
dichotomy, who regard postmodernism with more affection.) These
first two Essays hew to a line. Oriented as they are toward the goal of
antisubordination, Kleiman and MacKinnon will not let smoke and
contingency conceal what they declare to be basic premises about
gender and oppression. "I have a woman's psyche, formed by my
experience of being morphologically, biologically, sexually, and
socially a woman, ' 14 Kleiman writes, knowing well that some would
10. See id. at 141 (noting that Ozick titled one of her satirical early stories Virility to mock
the excessive attention paid to a writer's gender).
11. See Robin Morgan, Goodbye to All That, in FEMINISM IN OUR TIME 148, 149 (Miriam
Schneir ed., 1994).
12. Kelly Kleiman, Drag = Blackface, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 669 (2000).
13. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687
(2000).
14. Kleiman, supra note 12, at 682.
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contest the point.5 Writing as a woman interested in the plights and
prospects of women, Kleiman applies what Katharine Bartlett has
called one of several feminist legal methods: she looks at one social
practice, performance drag, and asks "the woman question.' 6
Kleiman concludes that performance drag-the prescriptive, coercive,
and reductionist appropriation of femininity by men, in public-is just
as pernicious as, and ought to be no more respectable than, blackface.
Her Essay adds to the large literature -academic and popular, legal
and extralegal-about the ground held in common by race and
gender.
In rejecting the drag-will-liberate-us-all-from-gender thesis that
still holds sway in the academy and elsewhere, Kleiman implicitly
denies what some postmodernists appear to have claimed, that a
posture is no more or less good or true than (what individuals
perceive as) reality. As Kleiman points out, should RuPaul ever
become vexed by pay inequality or glass ceilings or domestic violence,
he can always abandon his phony-woman persona, while Kleiman as a
real woman has no choice but to change the oppressive social
condition in question. And what Kleiman states implicitly, Catharine
MacKinnon declares in so many words.
MacKinnon indicts postmodernism on several charges. Whereas
feminism commits itself to knowing, naming, demonstrating, and
denouncing practices that hurt women-a task that frequently calls
for great bravery-postmodernism, having made an enemy out of
reality itself, dismisses and disparages these efforts. Despite strong
evidence that subordination of women is close to a cultural universal,
some postmodernist tendencies deny that the term "woman" has
meaning. 7 If there is no such thing as a woman, there must be no
such thing as the subjection of women; and perhaps the fact of the
Holocaust or the Bosnian rape campaign is just an option, to click or
not click, on our remote-control channel-changer. When
postmodernism isn't working to defeat feminism, MacKinnon
continues, it is ,stealing from feminism, claiming as its own such
insights as the critique of universality and the idea of social
construction. To MacKinnon, then, unfinished feminist business
15. See MacKinnon, supra note 13, at 694-95; see also KATHARINE T. BARTLETr &
ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 1077-90 (2d ed.
1998) (exploring conflicting feminist interpretations of the term "woman").
16. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 837-49
(1990).
17. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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includes the reclamation of stances and practices disparaged by
postmodernists as old-fashioned, if not wrongheaded. It will take
tenacity to honor MacKinnon's antisubordination ideal in any milieu
(such as the academy) where pomo-fashion adorns, or is at least
consistent with, conservative politics.
Elsewhere in the Symposium, writers pursue a similar vigilance.
While MacKinnon and Kleiman cast a suspicious eye on gender-
bender trendiness, other writers express doubts about the adequacies
of reforms effected at around the same time. They advocate what
might be called "re-reform." Feminism demands a reassessment of
recent landmarks. Has a reform backfired? Not gone far enough?
What about unintended consequences? This view, consistent with the
Ozickian approach to feminism, assumes that humanists, usually in
partnership with feminists, have effected some change: it is now the
business of feminism to revisit and refine these earlier efforts.
The task is one of focus, unity, crystallization-a clear distinction
between what is trivial and what lies at the center. Of the participants
in this Symposium, Penelope Bryan has put the point most starkly.
"While I respect the intellectual fertility that the different strands of
feminism represent," she writes, "I urge all feminists to work to set
aside their theoretical and policy differences and develop a cohesive
political agenda regarding women's issues in divorce. Although we
may want to deny it, we are engaged in an intense struggle with men,
a struggle with strong implications for our future. ' 18 Reasking the
Woman Question at Divorce looks at women in a discrete moment, a
time when their gendered condition puts them in peril, and asks
feminists to identify with this crisis: in particular, to help these women
keep custody of their children. This advocacy is a subset of reform-
even though "divorce reform" has not always been feminist, and
unfortunately includes the fathers' rights movement, mandatory
mediation of disputes within families, covenant marriage, and heavy-
handed pressure for joint custody. According to Bryan, an expert in
divorce law, feminists must survey the menu of divorce reforms
carefully, with attention to their consequences.
Unlike Cynthia Ozick, then, Bryan does not pursue an
"androgynous ideal"; and yet these two feminists share an insistence
that the agenda for feminists is straightforward and even (relatively)
simple. Bryan implicitly views feminism as the pursuit of women's




interests (or, perhaps, their claims to justice) in a gender-stratified
and unjust society. Here unfinished feminist business means
discerning the core, looking away from the distracting periphery, and
knowing a destructive new idea when you see one.
Indeed, unfinished feminist business, to many writers of the
Symposium, calls for old ideas and solutions. For Richard Kamm, the
familiar questioning of the women's movement as exclusionary,
elitist, and overconcerned with the needs of white professional
women has not been superseded or rendered obsolete.19 Kamm
brings to the Symposium his longstanding interest in, and familiarity
with, the life-circumstances of female migrant workers. These women
are exploited, vulnerable, and almost invisible in the lowest reaches of
agricultural labor.20
Similar to Penelope Bryan's analysis of the divorce-reform
agenda, Extending the Progress of the Feminist Movement to
Encompass the Rights of Migrant Farmworker Women associates
feminism with the unacknowledged needs and interests of vulnerable
women.21 Kamm takes no potshots at "feminists" for neglecting
farmworker women: as he points out, even energetic and sympathetic
activists find it hard to work in partnership with an isolated and
migratory population, often located far from cities and unable to
communicate in English. Instead he suggests a range of measures
that the women's movement, which he presumes to be interested in
the plight of female migrant farmworkers, could take to improve
these hard lives. This unfinished business, Kamm notes in his title,
would extend existing progress: when they become both objects of
current reform plans (some of which Kamm finds very promising) and
subjects who state their own agenda and speak for themselves,
migrant farmworker women will acquire a full civic humanity.
This humanistic approach to feminist business continues in the
Symposium. Next comes Lila Lee, who also relates an old idea that
remains new, unfinished in its promise: like Penelope Bryan's thesis,
it might be phrased as harm to women matters.2 2 Like Penelope
Bryan, Lee implicitly defines feminism as the pursuit of women's
situated interests; she also recognizes, as does Bryan, that feminists as
19. Richard Kamm, Extending the Progress of the Feminist Movement to Encompass the
Rights of Migrant Farmworker Women, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 765 (2000).
20. See id.
21. Compare Bryan, supra note 18, with Kamm, supra note 19.
22. Lila Lee, FACT's Fantasies and Feminism's Future: An Analysis of the FACT Briefs
Treatment of Pornography Victims, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 785,785-86 (2000).
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a group do not yet unite around her point. Following a tradition in
law reform, Lee returns to a long-concluded litigation and educes
from it a current agenda for change. (Recall the role of Plessy v.
Ferguson in the civil rights movement during the 1940s.) Although
Lee happens to disagree with the Seventh Circuit's holding in
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,23 her target in FACT's
Fantasies and Feminism's Future is not the judicial decision but rather
a "quintessential and definitive statement of liberal feminists on
pornography" - that is, the amicus brief that a group called the
Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force, or FACT, filed in the action.
Accessible to readers in a law review and still frequently cited,
the FACT brief is for Lee a vital and living antagonist. Lee faults the
FACT brief, and by extension the view of pornography expressed by
such feminists as Nadine Strossen (and Kate Millett, present at this
Symposium, who gave the FACT brief one of its most esteemed
signatures), for operating to deny the reality of harm to women qua
women. Robin West and other feminists have contended that the law
has let women down chiefly by failing to recognize-let alone
ameliorate-the gender-specific harms that they suffer.24  If
pornography is one such source of harm, then FACT's victory within
the judicial system is an important illustration of the need to reorient
law to what West has identified as its principal function for both men
and women: "to minimize the harms we suffer in social life." 25
Versions of feminism that keep a fastidious distance from the
experience of suffering must be replaced, Lee argues, with a respect
for women's testimony about harm. This testimony, offered two
decades ago in Indiana and Minnesota, is still unrefuted-and still
inadequately heard.
To put Lee's point more generally: an idea will have
consequences, and feminism has to respond to these outcomes.
Political liberalism thinks very highly of free speech, as Lee notes; but
it has been equally concerned with the problem of preventable or
remediable harm.26  When liberals allow the former priority to
overwhelm the latter in a way that women get hurt, feminists ought to
23. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
24. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 97 (1997); see also Linda C. McClain, The Liberal
Future of Relational Feminism: Robin West's Caring for Justice, 24 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 477, 479
(1999).
25. WEST, supra note 24, at 94.
26. See Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and
Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REv. 1275,1305-12 (1998).
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be moved into action. Katharine Baker continues this ideas-have-
consequences motif.27 Her study of sociobiology -perhaps the most
powerful intellectual bludgeon of all those currently used to enforce
the subordination of women -approaches a perceived antagonist with
some affability. Just because partisans of the status quo favor
references to biology when they argue that women's socially inferior
status is inevitable and should continue,28 Baker argues, it does not
follow that feminists must concede that biology is a discipline that
belongs only to their foes.
Long interested in the phenomenon of human fluidity or
mutability as it relates to law reform,29 Baker in Biology for Feminists
identifies considerable agreement between feminist and biological
perspectives on such legal categories as rape, marriage, and
parenthood. Both evolutionary biologists and feminists often see the
world as harsh if not ruthless, riven by strife and violence. But
neither approach makes the error of concluding that because things
are as they are, they cannot change. This mistake belongs to the
misinterpreters of biology. Static (not to say reactionary)
understandings of evolutionary psychology do not come naturally
from the science itself. Biology means life; life means change.
Cultivated social change is the prerogative of all organisms that can
understand their societies. And thus Baker-like the other six writers
in the first part of the Symposium-moves from theoretical insight to
a plan for action.
II.
If I could go back a year and do the invitations again, I would
make sure that at least one African-American writer joined the
Symposium. At the point when three invitations to such scholars
were out -each African-American invitee having articulated both her
interest in participating and the heavy writing commitments on her
calendar-I became imprudently confident that the goal of inclusion
would be fulfilled. Although news of the third decision to decline
27. See Baker, supra note 2.
2& See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in Modern Society: A Darwinian
View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 971 (1995).
29. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting
Autonomy by Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523 (1998) (arguing that orientations
toward both autonomy and connection can and should be influenced by environment);
Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663 (1999) (advocating a campaign
to revise attitudes and perceptions about, as well as inclinations toward, rape).
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came too late for me to extend more invitations, I take responsibility
for this result, because I could have prevented it with more careful
planning.
It is hard to specify precisely what I mourn. What is "this
result"? A lost forum for someone's writing? Yes, but there are
many others. The risk of provoking yet another critic to say again
that "feminists" means white female narcissists still (despite all those
reproaches) unaware of, or callous about, their tendency to exclude
on the basis of race? Most iterations of this complaint originate in
bad faith rather than anyone's sincere enthusiasm for racial
progress. 0 A silenced dialogue, a conversation foregone? None of
the contributors forfeited any "live" exchanges, as the Symposium
took place only on paper. Is it the substance, the text, of what a
writer of color would have written? But surely this lost content is no
more predictable, or even amenable to classification, than any other
unwritten essay.
This unsettled, ambiguous conclusion is not personal to me, and
it extends beyond an editorial judgment. Readers can find it
throughout the Symposium (and throughout feminist legal thought
generally), especially in the Essays of the second part. Continuing
this thread, I would argue that African-American feminist thinkers
are with us indirectly: it is they who have been preeminent in
expressing feminism as inherently contingent or, to use the phrase I
favor here, ever unfinished. In Black Feminist Thought, one of
several such contributions, Patricia Hill Collins describes an ideal of
feminism as congeries, or a pluralistic coming-together of different
sectors, where "each group perceives its own truth as partial, its
knowledge as unfinished."3 Later feminist works have synthesized
and expanded on this description. 32
Essays of this second part of the Symposium work with the
variable, shifting version of feminism that Collins champions.
Whereas, for example, Penelope Bryan sorts good reform proposals
from bad ones, another reformer, Victoria Nourse, argues that
success rides in the same vehicle as failure: strength and weakness are
two faces of the same reform coin.33 The Essays in the first half have
30. See generally MacKinnon, supra note 13, at 697-98.
31. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUS-
NESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 236 (1990).
32. See BARTLETT & HARRIS, supra note 15, at 1100-06 (describing "positionality" and
other attempts to articulate the contingent nature of feminist truth).
33. Victoria Nourse, The "Normal" Successes and Failures of Feminism and the Criminal
2000]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
grappled with What Is to Be Done?-a contention that the
Enlightenment agenda is still unfinished. These latter pieces provide
six illustrations of the point that feminist business is ever unfinished.
The second-half Essays break into three pairs. The first pair
explores a theme of returning to one's old ideas and preoccupations.
Unlike some of their predecessors at the Symposium, Jennifer Brown
and Tracy Higgins find uncertainty and ambiguity when they revisit
theses they had addressed in earlier scholarship. In making revisions,
they describe feminist business as a work in progress. Brown's title,
Apostasy?,34 sums up in a word (plus a punctuation mark) the idea of
feminist business as ever unfinished. With the noun, she comments
on her decision to retreat partially from "To Give Them
Countenance," her 1998 endorsement of a separate law school for
women students.3 1 It may be apostasy for someone who believes that
a separate law school could work well as a feminist instrument-
something that would combat the "alienation, silence, and
underachievement" 36 that many believe women experience in
coeducational law schools-to sacrifice some antisubordination
momentum for the purpose of including in the new law school those
men who would thrive on terms similar to those that the women
students would enjoy there. But with the question mark, Brown
retreats a bit in the other direction. Her modification may not be
apostasy at all, she writes, even though it creates new opportunities
for men rather than women, in that it advances a political vision that
would defy gender stereotypes. At the end of the Essay, when Brown
leaves the subject (for the moment) of legal education for women
away from male classmates, a reader senses that for this careful
scholar-a beneficiary, as well as an observer, of single-sex higher
education -the question will never quite settle.
Tracy Higgins's measured approval of the public/private
distinction in legal and political theory raises another question that is
not amenable to one definitive or permanent answer.37 Higgins finds
it remarkable that feminist theorizing on the boundary between
public and private has been almost monolithic. She calls for more
Law, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 951, 951-53 (2000).
34. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Apostasy?, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 837 (2000).
35. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, "To Give Them Countenance": The Case for a Women's Law
School, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1998).
36. Id. at 5.
37. Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75
CHi.-KENT L. REV. 847 (2000).
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variety, even instability (in contrast to Penelope Bryan, for instance,
who has urged feminists to put differences aside and come together),
while at the same time embracing a traditional dichotomy. Higgins
sees value in the public/private distinction: it strikes her as
descriptively accurate and instrumentally useful. She thinks that
some of what feminist theorists attack under the rubric of the
public/private distinction is actually a problem of too much power
held in private hands. The challenge for feminists is to question this
allocation without abjuring privacy and the private sphere, concepts
that have been friends to women. Higgins describes the task as one of
moving the public/private critique "from the category of 'foregone
conclusion' to 'unfinished business.' ' 38  Like Jennifer Brown's
reassessment of single-sex education, this task will not easily stop
needing to be undertaken again.
This exploration of instability and change in feminist legal
thought continues with the work of Reem Bahdi and Orit Kamir,
younger scholars who seek to take feminist legal scholarship beyond
the printed word on the page, and into new media. For Bahdi, the
medium is the Internet, "an instrument of paradox. '39 Some writers
view the Internet as an infinitely powerful tool that creates new
communities, wipes away national boundaries, and weakens all the
old vertical hierarchies: nation, church, patriarchy.4° Others see a
sinister, enervating machine that drains individuals and their culture
away from the physical experiences -such as face-to-face contact-
that are necessary to their life.41 Having been trained in law before
moving to information technology, Bahdi finds herself reminded of
the debate over whether international human rights are of value to
the oppressed. Like international human rights, the Internet is
abstract, expensive, and associated with literacy and other elite
accouterments.
Yet Bahdi would not throw the Internet away. After noting its
accomplishments in the field of women's international human rights,
Bahdi concludes that "conscious and constant checking and re-
checking is required" to monitor the Internet in this work. 42 To
38. Id. at 848.
39. Reem Bahdi, Analyzing Women's Use of the Internet Through the Rights Debate, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 869, 883-85 (2000).
40. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE HORIZONTAL SOCIETY 26, 224 (1999); Bahdi,
supra note 39, at 890-92.
41. See Bahdi, supra note 39, at 881-82.
42. Id. at 897.
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Bahdi, the Internet itself is doing the same thing. Referring to her
own experiences on the Internet, she quotes with approval Donna
Haraway's claim that "'the knowing self is partial in all its guises,
never finished, whole, simply there and original; it is always
constructed and stitched together imperfectly'"4 -an insight that
Bahdi believes derives from the experience of Internet
communication, and a comment on ever-unfinished business.
For Orit Kamir the new medium of choice is film.44 In Feminist
Law and Film: Imagining Judges and Justice, Kamir seeks "to
broaden the feminist horizon and open up unfamiliar territory" by
commending attention to the film High Heels, which Kamir views as a
dramatization of "caring" (rather than Anglo-American or
Solomonic) justice.45 Judge Dominguez, a character in the movie, is a
man who experiences, intuits, expresses emotions, engages with facts,
and loves his mother-all while doing his job. In its explorations of
how to merge the ethic of justice with the ethic of care, 46 feminist legal
thought would be poorer not to reflect on this fictional judge. But
Kamir is quick to point out that film is only one of many sources of
what she calls "cultural images" 47 that can inform and buttress legal
thought, and that even the vast category of cultural images is just one
of several new fronts for feminist growth. Her argument is one of
manifest destiny: to Kamir feminist business is so unfinished, and so
impossible to finish, that one cannot imagine any facet of society or
culture that could not play a role in this expansion.
In contrast to Kamir, who likes to find her feminist legal theory
far from the law books, Jane Schacter and Victoria Nourse use more
traditional materials to support their separate arguments that feminist
business is ever unfinished. They both have particular interest in one
subcategory: newly written or reinterpreted statutes. Although these
materials are traditional, they generate new conclusions for these
writers.
Schacter, noted for pathbreaking scholarship on statutory
interpretation, brings this expertise to "second-parent adoption," a
process whereby an adult becomes the legal parent of a child without
the child's parent relinquishing parental rights.48 Such adoptions take
43. Id. at 884.
44. Kamir, supra note 1, at 899-904.
45. Id. at 900.
46. See generally WEST, supra note 24 (arguing that justice is not possible without care).
47. Kamir, supra note 1, at 900.
48. Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures, and
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place all the time, even though a requirement of relinquishment or
termination is found in many adoption statutes. Courts have
interpreted the relinquishment language as containing one obvious
exception: When a person who, having married another person who
happens to be a custodial parent, wishes to adopt the new spouse's
child, and the original co-parent presents no obstacle to the adoption
(perhaps he consents to it and is willing to relinquish the child;
perhaps he is dead or otherwise absent), then surely the custodial
parent, the new spouse of the one who seeks to adopt, should not
have to relinquish parenthood of her own child. So far so good. But
what happens when the prospective adoptive parent is a same-sex
partner of the birth parent? The statutes say nothing about lesbian
and gay families. Analogical reasoning is indeterminate here: the
prospective parent is like a stepparent, in that she seeks to rear the
child along with the child's birth parent; she is not like a stepparent, in
that she isn't married.
In defending the solution that most appellate courts have given
to this analytical puzzle-yes, the same-sex partner may adopt
without relinquishment by the first parent-Schacter unites feminism
with theories (hers and others) about the relationship between
statutory interpretation and democracy. She argues that as a matter
of institutional competence, even a staunch majoritarian would agree
that the question of whether a child should be reared in a particular
home is one better answered by judges than legislatures; the issue has
been delegated to the proper institution. But staunch majoritarianism
is not the only possible approach to problems of statutory
interpretation. What Schacter calls "thicker democratic values '49 call
out for bringing gay and lesbian families into public view. Silenced
and hidden by both discrimination and violence, lesbians and gay men
are not fully present in public. Second-parent adoption rights help to
remedy this loss by allowing individuals to live as they are in public-
affirming their relationships with both their intimate partners and
their children-just as other citizens are permitted to live.
But is it feminist business? Yes. Schacter situates her argument
as one of "multiple efforts to create legal and social spaces that can
accommodate different lives -including, to name a few, a life in
which women do not marry or bear children, in which women raise
children without men, or in which same sex couples live or raise
Second-Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 933 (2000).
49. Id. at 947.
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children together," the feminist task being "to dislodge the normative
nuclear family as the only legitimate affiliative structure in which
women-and men too-might live."50 The normative nuclear family
has been said to oppress women in many respects. It has provided
patriarchal authority for men, a curtained-off sphere where rape and
battering become officially unseen and, in the not-distant-enough
past, an excuse for deprivations of women's civil rights such as the
franchise and the right to own property or make contracts. Schacter
adds enforced heterosexism and disparagement of gay and lesbian
parenting to the list. But she has done more than catalogue
oppressions; she also offers a vision of expansion. Like Orit Kamir,
who speaks of broader horizons and wider territory, Schacter wants
to create new spaces. This argument, like Schacter on statutory
interpretation, rejects rigidity and ossification in favor of continuous
change.
For a complementary perspective on new statutes and their
reception among the judiciary and the public, we now turn to the last
Essay, contributed by Victoria Nourse. Nourse, a scholar known not
only for her legal writings but also as an accomplished legislative
counsel, evaluates the achievements and shortcomings of feminist
reforms in criminal law.51  Commentators, especially men not
associated with feminism, have been impressed by the achievements
of feminism in reforming American criminal law.52 Nourse, less easily
satisfied, sees "simultaneous success and failure."53 The paradox of
reform is that while the concept of survival ordinarily connotes
strength, in order to survive the upheaval of legislative consensus and
judicial re-education a feminist reform of the criminal law must be, in
a strategic way, weak: Nourse writes of "deliberate ambiguity," pulled
punches that can land someplace near their targets.54
Filling the gaps are "norms," a word that has been much beloved
in the legal academy over the last decade or so; Nourse, dissenting,
suggests that norms become less benign when they have the power to
override the protections and safeguards of criminal law. For example,
she writes, one norm holds that the role of "date or wife or colleague"
50. Id. at 933.
51. Nourse, supra note 33.
52. See id. at 951 n.1 (citing George Fletcher and Sanford Kadish as "skeptics" who have
been impressed by the achievements of feminist reform); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Feminist
Approaches to Tort Law, in THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript
at 42 n.146) (noting that tort law cannot point to similar feminist contributions).
53. Nourse, supra note 33, at 951.
54. Id. at 959-60.
[Vol. 75:641
FOREWORD: STILL UNFINISHED, EVER UNFINISHED
makes relations "voluntary, consensual, and 'normal,' which means
no coercion, no rape."5  Victims therefore must engage in very
earnest resistance, even after reformers in the jurisdiction have
worked hard to eliminate a resistance element in the prima facie case
of rape. When battered women kill in self-defense, a norm often
reproaches them because they should have left, even though
hornbook self-defense law contains no duty to retreat before the
harm arises: "The man who walks into the dangerous bar for the
fiftieth time or walks into a dangerous neighborhood for the eightieth
does not lose his self-defense claim because he should have 'left'
before the knife was above his head."56
Just as she differs with the majority of law-review writers on the
subject of norms, Nourse ventures a dissent from the standard
feminist notion that recommendations about theory and policy must
be rooted in women's experience. Before battered woman syndrome
there was the law of self-defense, whose core concepts (imminence,
necessity, and reasonable perceptions of a dangerous situation) not
only fit situations where women kill their batterers but also spare
these women the burden of presenting themselves in "subjective"
terms-that is, as peculiar victims who engage in special pleading.
For Nourse "women's experience" sounds uncomfortably close to
social norms about relationship 7 a force that defeats reform.
Offering a statement that can serve as an epigraph for the entire
second half of the Symposium, Nourse writes that "feminist reforms
have a kind of built-in, albeit unpredictable, capacity for failure; like
the apple harboring the worm, they harbor the possibility of their own
undoing. I say this not because I believe that failure's normalcy
makes reform futile, but... because it makes the need for continued
reform equally 'normal.' "58
I am delighted to present these thirteen Essays on how feminist
business remains still unfinished and ever unfinished.
55. Id. at 956.
56. Id. at 973.
57. Id. at 953-58.
58. Id. at 953.
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